Snowstorm chaos in 2010 worsened by lack of leadership and coordination, files reveal
- Safer Highways
- 3 days ago
- 2 min read

The disruption caused by a major snowstorm that stranded thousands of motorists across Scotland in 2010 was exacerbated by poor preparation and a lack of coordination between key authorities, newly released government documents suggest.
The extreme weather event, described at the time as a “snow bomb”, hit central Scotland on 6 December 2010 during the height of the morning rush hour, rapidly bringing parts of the road network to a standstill. One of the worst-hit locations was the M8 between Harthill and Denny, where hundreds of vehicles were left stuck overnight in sub-zero temperatures.
Local residents living near the motorway stepped in to help, providing stranded drivers with food and hot drinks.
In the aftermath of the blizzard, Stewart Stevenson resigned as Scotland’s transport secretary after initially describing the Government’s handling of the situation as “first class”.
Cabinet papers released by the Scottish Government under the 15-year disclosure rule now shed further light on the response, indicating that shortcomings at senior levels contributed to the severity of the situation.
At the time, opposition parties accused the Scottish Government of lacking leadership and direction—criticisms that appear to be echoed in the internal assessments contained within the documents.
The papers conclude there was a failure of strategic leadership and central oversight on both Sunday 5 December and Monday 6 December, when the storm struck.
They also point to a lack of early coordination between Police Scotland, Transport Scotland’s control centre and transport operators, noting that information was not reaching decision-makers quickly enough.
According to the documents, the Cabinet sub-committee overseeing the response was not made fully aware of how serious conditions had become when it met on the afternoon of 6 December.
The snowfall was heavier than forecast and fell across the central belt during peak travel hours, causing widespread disruption. Major sections of the trunk road network were closed, while many local roads became impassable.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that many people had returned to work and school that day after earlier weather-related disruption, leaving large numbers facing journeys home that were described as “difficult or impossible”.
As a result, the papers warn that many members of the public were left in potentially vulnerable circumstances.
The newly released papers also highlight concerns about preparedness ahead of the severe weather, suggesting contingency plans were either inadequate or not properly activated. Despite forecasts warning of heavy snowfall, the documents indicate that decisive action to restrict travel or pre-emptively manage the trunk road network was not taken early enough.
The files note that responsibilities between agencies were poorly defined, leading to uncertainty over who was ultimately in charge of coordinating the response as conditions rapidly deteriorated. This lack of clarity, the papers suggest, contributed to delays in closing roads, deploying gritters and communicating clear advice to the public.
In the aftermath of the storm, the Scottish Government introduced a series of changes aimed at improving resilience during extreme weather, including clearer command structures and improved information-sharing between transport bodies and emergency services. However, the papers make clear that in December 2010, these systems were not yet in place, with serious consequences for thousands of motorists caught out by the sudden and severe conditions.